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Chapter One
This thesis examines the interwar peace movement of outlawry and its founder Salmon
Levinson. Many peace movements that emerged in the years following World War I. People
were desperate for lasting peace after the carnage of the Great War. One movement that is often
ignored or given only little interest is outlawry. The other popular movements of the time, such
as the push for the League of Nations and disarmament, generally receive more attention from
scholars studying peace and the success of movements to prevent war. The example focused on
when outlawry is considered is the Kellogg-Briand Pact, a treaty that was the result of an
international attempt to remove the legality of war. This thesis argues that the outlawry
movement was a complex and realistic peace effort that had the support of not only powerful
politicians, but also the support of the general public.
Salmon Levinson, a Chicago lawyer, created outlawry, with the help of many allies. He
spent years refining the belief that war could come to an end if war was made illegal and steps
taken to ensure warmakers were held accountable. He <ltd help to bring about the Kellogg -Briand
Pact, which was a success for the outlawry proponents, despite its inability to prevent World War
II. Outlawry was a highly idealistic peace plan, operating under the belief that laws were the
ultimate power that would put an end to war. However, this thesis seeks to prove that outlawry
was important to understanding the environment in the interwar years and how the effects of
World War I created a world ripe for peace movements. This thesis also shows the power that
one individual can have and how it just takes one idea to change the world.
This chapter considers the effect of World War One, the League of Nations, the attempts
at disarmament, and Levinson 's views of the other peace movements. The international stage
was flooded with peace activists following the conclusion of WWI, with many bringing their
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own concept of how to achieve peace. Some supported the League of Nations, which the Treaty
of Versailles created as an organization dedicated to the foundation of a lasting peace. This
chapter will show how the League became an unsatisfying solution for Levinson and many other
desperate for a peace plan. The inadequacies of the League left the field open for other peace
activists' plans. The disarmament movement also found a base in the interwar years, with many
believing the way to peace was by limiting arms internationally. However, this chapter will
demonstrate the limitations of the disarmament movement and how it struggled to navigate basic
issues about the clashing interests of various nations. Salmon Levinson will be introduced in this
chapter. We learn how his disillusion with the League and disarmament led to his introduction of
outlawry as the strongest peace plan. Indeed, the failures and distrust of the League and
disarmament provided vital space for outlawry to grow and gain momentum in the race for a
successful peace movement.
World War I was unlike anything anyone had ever seen before, creating a new world
order that could only emerg� from a global conflict. When the war began, it was meant be a "war
to end war," and people believed that it would be the last battle between nations leading to
lasting peace. 1 The Great War was launched to right wrongs that were both real and imagined,
with the belligerents bringing destruction that had been unprecedented and on an unimaginable
scale. 2 The United States began as a neutral nation in
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but it too eventually would be

brought into the global conflict, with President Woodrow Wilson leading the country into its first
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total war. While the war was fought in Europe, everyone in the United States would be a part of

1 Robert Ferrell, Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1952), 12.
2 Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 104.
3 Ferrell, 11.
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the war effort, whether through building ammunitions, fighting, driving ambulances, or caring
for wounded after they returned. Philip Kerr, a British politician, recalled in 1 929 the atmosphere
immediately following the war: "It is what may happen when war breaks out, not the direct
aggression of others, that most nations worry about and arm against."4 By November 1 1 , 1 9 18,
the world was weary of war and rejoiced at the peace brought by the Allies, hoping that the
Armistice would be the start of a peaceful world and the end of global conflicts.5 At the end of
WWI, 8 million combatants were dead and roughly 3 .5 percent of the European population had
died due to the war. 6 With the battlefields quieted, the focus of the Allies turned from war to
peace and how to organize a world that had been seen destruction it never could have imagined.
Out of the chaos and drive for peace came four important peace issues: The World Court, the
League of Nations, disarmament, and militarism, all of which would be a focus in the years
following the Armistice. 7 WWI would have many repercussions that were felt for years to come,
but one of great importance would be Levinson's introduction to the world stage and his work
.. for a legal world peace.
.
Salmon Levinson is not a name that is widely known. Although he started a peace
movement whose efforts would result in a multi-national anti-war treaty, Levinson chose to do
most of his work behind the scenes, letting others promote his ideas. Levinson's grandfather fled
Germany in the late 1 840s to escape the Prussian militarist regime. Levinson's father moved to
Noblesville, Indiana with his family . 8 Salmon came from a prosperous, middle-class family, who
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Philip Kerr to Salmon Levinson, 23 May 1929, Box 26, Folder 3, Salmon Levinson Papers 1905- 1998, Special
Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library, Chicago IL (Hereafter Levinson Papers).
5 Ferrell, 3.
6 Hathaway and Shapiro, 1 04.
7 Ferrell, 15.
8John Stoner, S. 0. Levinson and the Pact ofParis: A Study in the Techniques ofInfluence (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1942), 1.

5
were the only Jewish members of the Noblesville community. 9 His father ran a dry goods store
and was a source of advice for public officials, including congressmen, who would come to talk
over speeches and get pointers. 10 Salmon Levinson went to the University of Chicago and Yale
b efore getting his law degree from Lake Forest College, then he moved to Chicago and worked
at his uncle's law firm. After facilitating a large settlement in a particular case, Levison b ecame a
junior partner at his uncle's firm of Moses and Newman, but he and a coworker, Benjamin V.
Becker, would organize their own firm in the coming years.11 Unknown to him at the time,
Levinson's journey to become a lawyer would lead him to become an important player in the
peace movements following WWI and he would b e at the center of a forward thinking, legalistic
anti-war campaign.
Levinson's work as a young lawyer would help him to build an understanding not just of
law, but of the innerworkings of people and governmental interactions. In an article, "The Legal
Status of War," written in 1 9 1 8, Levinson explained that his experience in law had been, "largely
in dealing with problems arising from conflicts of interest due to industrial breakdowns and a
consequent need for reorganization."12 In 1 908 Levinson had helped to reorganize the properties
controlled by George Westinghouse, as well as having a part in reorganizing the Frisco and the
Chicago & Eastern Illinois railroads. 13 The fees that Levinson earned from work and investments
in the companies he reorganized would serve as the basis for the fortune he later spent so fr eely
in his peace work. 14 Levinson did not realize that when he b egan his law work that it would lead

9 M.W. Childs, "A Chicago Lawyer's One-Man War Against War," 14 April 1929, Box 29, Folder 11, Levinson
Papers.
1 0 Stoner, 2.
11 Stoner, 6-7.
1 2 Salmon Levinson, "The Legal Status of War," 9 March 1918, Box 29, Folder 9, Levinson Papers.
1 3 Childs, "A Chicago Lawyer's," Box 29, Folder 11, Levinson Papers.
1 4 Stoner, 8.
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him to become a peace activist, but all the practice he had as a lawyer would allow him to create
a strong peace plan.
While he had spent the first few years of the 1900s reorganizing struggling business
ventures, Levison had never given much thought to international affairs until he observed, at the
beginning of WWI, that the war was affecting the US stock market.15 However, once Levison
was aware of the financial impact of the war, he came to be convinced that international relations
were not diff erent from industrial relations; in both, one had to convince the parties to act
rationally and to persuade them not to make a bad situation worse. 16 Levinson said his financial
law background convinced him that "the problem of adjusting large conflicting corporate interest
is not essentially different as a human problem from that of the adjustment of conflicting national
interests."17 After Levinson decided to enter the discussion about finding a solution to war, he
would say in 1922 that he was motivated by "hatred of war and love of peace both as economic
and moral propositions" but he was not willing to accept just any solution for peace. 18 Levinson
would not be the only person to step into the world of international politics because of W\\11 . It
was a crowded field full of passionate voices supporting their own agenda. Levinson quickly
found that international relations had a tradition of compromise that he was not willing to accept.
As Levinson experienced his awakenings to the bitter realities of international conflict
and the potential of lasting peace, the League of Nations, President Woodrow Wilson's hope for
the world, seemed to be failing. It was a complex organization that took months of compromise
and adjustments to establish as an international organization. There w ere diplomats from various
countries who all had the interest of their nation at heart, and from the beginning, there were
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q ualms about the true neutrality and usefulness of the League. Thomas Knock wrote
Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order

To End All

focusing on President Wilson and

his contribution to the creation of the League of Nations. The president was well known as a
major designer of the League of Nations, his Fourteen-Point plan for peace being a famous
stepping-stone to the League's Covenant. While Knock recognizes the failings of the League, he
shows the strategies and plans that were behind the foundation of the League and how they
became distorted in the attempt to satisfy all world players and parties involved in negotiations.
In the beginning, Wilson came up with a four-point program for the League: 1 ) no nation shall
ever again be permitted to acquire an inch of land by conquest, 2) recognition of the reality of
equal rights between small nations and great, 3) munitions of war had to be manufactured
entirely by the nations and not private enterprise, and 4) necessity of an association of nations,
bound together for the protection of each, so that any nation breaking this bond would be bring
war and punishment upon itself. 19 In laying out what Wilson' s original focus points for the
League Knock demonstrates how much the plan changed in th� negotiations and how that
burdened the League's ability to function as a peacekeeping organization. In Wilson's mind, the
League would make arbitration compulsory and decisions binding; it would hold out absolute
guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence while also supporting selfdetermination; and disarmament would be a serious priority that was integral to the success of
the whole system.20
Wilson had high hopes for what the League could accomplish. But, Knock shows why
the League proved unable to follow through on so many of the original goals in its Covenant. In

19 Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992), 35.
20
Knock, 153.
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its design "The Covenant was both definite enough to guarantee peace and elastic enough to
provide for readjustment, its powers subject to 'those who exercise it and in accordance with the
changing circumstances of the time,'" but it was also doomed to fail without strong enough
support or power, concludes Knock. 21 In his study, Knock focuses primarily on President Wilson
and how his life and political career lead to, and maybe hindered, the formation of the League of
Nations and its ensuing failure to stop continued war.
The League of Nations, when created in 1 920 at the Paris Peace Conference, was a
controversial organization that found allies and enemies in all places. People often took issue
with the Covenant and felt that the League failed in its ultimate goals to put an end to war and
serve as a peacekeeping organization. A 1 9 19 artic le, "Conflicting Interests at the Peace
Conference," written by American journalist J.C. Walsh, argues "The Peace Conference is
popularly supposed to be engaged in so remaking the world that in future there will be nothing to
go to war about" which is indicative of the hope the world had at the thought of a peace
agreement that the world powers 'Yere negotiating. 22 However, despite the hope for a lasting
peace, the secrecy that was surrounding the peace conference made the populations watching
nervous. Many of the governments which sent delegations to the conference w ere not
forthcoming as negotiations were taking place. Walsh writes about the various possibilities for
such secrecy-England, in particular, eager to extend its imperial system, France and Italy
seeking to gain new territory, Greece trying to restore the Byzantine Empire, Rumania seeking to
become a secondary power, and even the Serbs and Croats already in a quasi-conflict with
Italy . 23 Walsh conveys both the hope and distrust the world population had for the peace

211Cnock, 233-234.
22J.C. Walsh, "Conflicting Interests at the Peace Conference," A merica 20, no. 18 (2/8/1919): 438.
23 Walsh, 440.
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conference and how the seeds of doubt were in place before the League of Nations even took full
form. An organization that came to being with mixed reactions would already have to fight to
prove its worth, and the League had to work against many handicaps to fulfill any of the
peacekeeping goals set forth in the Covenant.
Even years after the creation of the League of Nations, the world was still waiting for the
organization to follow through on some of the promises that had been made at its founding.
League designers had planned for it to hold a powerful and respected position in international
relations as the peacekeeper that kept the world from war. Swiss diplomat Max Habicht gave a
speech in 1939 called "Successes and Failures of the League of Nations" in which he provided
his immediate insights on the League of Nations up to that point. Two years after its inception,
Habicht explained, the League created the World Court at The Hauge, consisting of fifteen
permanent judges appointed to settle legal disputes between nation-states, open to any sovereign
state wishing to use it.24 Habicht recognized, however, that the biggest danger did not come from
conflip ts over the rights and obligations of states, but instead from disputes over the change of
rights and obligations, or the changing status quo of states. 25 The League did not have the power
and backing to follow through on the attempts made to settle disputes, or in some cases, the
League did not act fast enough to be able to come to a settlement. League members realized that
the League could only be helpful in "settling disputes and organizing international cooperation
whenever the immediate interests of all partners are parallel" and considering they seldom were
parallel, the League was left without much success.26 Habicht acknowledged some League
successes, such as keeping an eye on the mandatory territories created by the League Covenant.

24

Max Habicht, "Successes and Failures of the League of Nations," Vital Speeches of the Day 5, no. 22 (9/1/1939):
703.
25 Habicht, 703.
26 Habicht, 704.
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He also cited some failures, such as the League's inability to protect some 40 minorities created
through peac e treaties and its failure at achieving military or economic disarmament.27 Sharp
debate then ensued about the League. Some did not agree with the League and the Covenant that
created it, and others believed that it was too strong or that it was not strong enough. Either way,
the League hardly put an end to peace movements following WWI, instead its presence
encouraged people like Levinson to push for his own ideas in the wake of the League' s
controversy .
Another aspect that is important to understanding the League of Nations and its
connection to peace movements is to examine how emerging internationalism affected the
League's ability to function across national lines and connect countries with different agendas.
Historian Mark Mazower's study,

Governing the World: The History of an Idea,

traces the

progression of internationalism from before the first world war all the way to the more modem
creation of the United Nations. "Internationalism, in its modem sense as a movement of
cooperation among nations and their peoples, was moving from the realm of marginal ideas into
the mainstream," wrote Mazower, referencing the international work that became prominent as
the League of Nations was founded.28 The influence of the ideology of internationalism can best
be seen in the attempts to establish a World Court in cooperation with the League of Nations.
American diplomat Elihu Root, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1912 , believed that it was not
possible to have legislation or an international police force control people, but instead that an
international court was the best way to ensure peace.29 Many of the people who took part in
creating the League of Nations believed peace was rooted in international law creation and the

27

Habicht, 703.
Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin Press, 2012): 23.
29 Mazower, 91.
28
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establishment of a strong international court that would interpret and lay down the law . However,
those same people w ere discouraged when in the Leagu e Covenant, the court had practically
disappeared and international law was hardly mentioned. 30 While Mazower's focus is on
internationalism, specifically the world court, he also outlines other weaknesses in the structure
of the League of Nations. The assembly looked like a legislature, but had no lawmaking
capabilities; the secretariat was a w eak coordinating body with no powers independent of the
League's members; and the League had no standing forces or any machinery for enforcing peace
past the commitment of its members to submit disputes to arbitration. 3 1 Mazower introduces
another way to study the Leagu e of Nations by using internationalism to understand the structure
of the League and how it led to disputes, making way for people like Levinson to step in with
their own, powerful peace plans.
Levinson followed the proceedings at the Paris Peace Conference with interest; he was
already an active member of international peac e movements, and he waited with the rest of the
world to see what would come of the global peace conference. However, from the start, Levinson
had concerns about peac e negotiations. In 1 9 18, he wrote "I am so afraid that the Versailles
conference will end, so far as the League of Nations is concerned, in some 20th century rhetoric,
which may be an improvement upon the diction used in the 1 9th century but when the test comes
there will be a laugh on the "radicals" again."32 Levinson did express early hope for the Leagu e,
concluding in 19 1 9, "the plan brought home by the President is the best scheme for a League of
Nations that has been tendered to the World," a sentiment echoed by many peac e activist s who
saw Wilson's Fourteen Points as a valid peac e plan. 33 However, Levinson's distrust of
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Mazower, 138.
Mazower, 136.
32 Salmon Levinson to John Dewey, 28 December 1918, Box 15, Folder 23, Levinson Papers.
33 Salmon Levinson to Philander Knox, 21 February 1919, Box 26, Folder 9, Levinson Papers.
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diplomacy and politicians combined with his strong faith in the legal processes soon led him to
discount the League because o f its lack o f legal language or foundation . 34 In June of 1919,
Levinson wrote, "If a real plan to abolish and outlaw war were put to Clemenceau, Orland and
Makino, it would get no votes from these imperialists and militarist s" making it clear that he fe lt
that the League had not met his expectations and he put some of the blame on the men who made
it . 35 He viewed the Le ague Covenant as an "alliance plus ... a constitution without power and a
system without machinery" and that de spite all of the work put into the Le ague, too much time
had been spent pleasin g the different national powers.36 Levinson was hardly alone in opposing
US membership in the League-many congressional leaders shared his distrust of the
organization- so the United States would not become a member o f the League of Nations.
Advocates of the League would work to counteract the objections to the League, but
problems were so varied that they could never convince enough people to change position.
Levinson would stand by his position against the League, writing in

1923

that even if affirmative

jurisdiction over justiciable disputes were added to the makeup of th� court created by the
_
League, that there would still be two major issues with the League. Levinson wrote that a code
needed to be created. Without such a code, the Court would remain arbitral and the nations
would distrust it, as there would be no limiting constitutional principles. He also insisted that the
code would have to outlaw war in order to be successful.37 He recognized the danger of the
League as it existed, writing in

1924,

that,

...to control the world by force with the re al powe r in the hands of three or four
nations coupled with a potential threat to United States that unless she becomes
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Stoner, 49.
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member o f League and submits to councils jurisdiction we may find ourselves in
war with all League nations automatically against us. 38
All while working and refining his own peace plan, Levinson felt the pressure of the League
supporters, who were working as h ard as he to secure backing for their organization . In a letter
he received in

1923

from William Hard, one of his allies, Hard lamented, "the drive to get us into

the League is at this v ery moment extremely vigorous and extremely dangerous and is taking
every form and using every argument necessary in order to trick us."39 Levinson's peace plan
then would help them to fight the League and its malicious influence. However, it was not just
the movement to get the United States into the League of Nations th at pressured Levinson as he
tried to promote his own peace plan . The disarmament movement had found some support in the
League's Covenant, and it used its public support to push an agenda o f peace through decreasing
armaments.
Part of the League o f Nations Covenant dealt with disarmament. An article existed in the
Covenant promoting in vague terms dis� ament, but not laying out an idea as to the how and
when. Historian Andrew Webster's article ""Absolutely Irresponsible Amateurs": The
Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments,

1921- 1924,"

examines the League of Nations

committee designated to temporarily deal with the issue of disarmament and its implementation.
Disarmament, Webster asserts, "touched at the very heart of every interwar debate over
international and national security" making it a very important goal for the League o f Nations to
pursue.40 The Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments was created in

192 1

after

discussions at the first League Assembly revealed that had been little to no progress at any
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disarmament goals. 41 The TMCA was supposed to be made up of private citizens, unrestrained
by formal instructions from governments, and therefore it could set forth ideas that could be too
problematic politically if presented from official representatives. 42 However, as Webster points
out, there were immediate problems with the commission from the beginning, stemming from
the membership. The TMCA was to include : six people competent in political, social and
economic matters; four economic experts from the League's Economic and Financial
Commissions; and six experts from the Governing Body of the International Labour
Organization, consisting of three employers' representative s and three workers'
representatives. 43 It proved impossible to get nations to agree on non-political members being
appointed, and the French and British even insisted that members from the military commission
on disarmament be included in the TMCA, tying it to the political effort for disarmament. 44
Because of the various missteps and outside intervention, the TMCA was unable to achieve
much in terms of disarmament. The focus of the commission was also hampered by the absence
of the Unite e States, Germany, and Russia from the League . Plus, many members were
concerned with whether Germany has disarmed as the Treaty of Versailles demanded. 45 With so
much outside influence and very limited power, the TMCA did the best that it could to
encourage disarmament and come up with plans that the differing governments might accept.
Webster explores the failures o f the disarmament movement, and specifically the group within
the League that was tasked with the issue and how the Le ague' s influence over the commission
left it with little room to succeed.
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Disarmament was not a complete failure, but many peace activists felt that the world was
not ready for disarmament and that there were many diplomatic and international issues that
halted the progress of lowering armaments. So disappointing was the League, the organization
was permanently tainted, even for historians. Andrew Webster notes few studies provide
comprehensive examinations of the League since most scholars dismiss it for its shortcomings.46
Scholarly literature on the interwar efforts for international disarmament has focused on the
inevitable failure of the movement due to unchecked nationalism of the League's members.47
During the early 1920s, the disarmament initiative by the League was handled by three bodies:
the all -military Permanent Advisory Commission on Armaments established 1920, the primarily
civilian TMCA established 192 1, and the Disarmament Section of the League's Secretariat.48
Inspired by the work of these various commissions, some people saw disarmament as a way to
create a more stable international state system with peaceful interactions encouraging an
international community, but that belief in disarmament was quickly dashed by the commissions
inability to accomplish anything of importance.
Despite the many committees dedicated disarmament, it was impossible to keep national
interests out of the work which created constant pressure for those working towards
disarmament. One of the persistent issues surrounding arms limitations was that some people
saw disarmament as a tool to increase their own national security through collaboration over
disarmament reducing threats.49 In the second Assembly of the League, one of the members said:
"I wonder whether it is not the very armaments of nations which create conflicts. In any case
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they create distrust, and perpetuate the atmosphere of mutual fear among nations, which is the
most profound and fruitful cause of international crises."50 This sentiment seems to express well
the League's na'ive desire to achieve disarmament regardless of the individual desires of various
nations. There were various ways the League sought to progress in the disarmament movement.
Their initiatives included: controlling the international arms traffic, regulating private
manufacture of armaments, mandating open publication data on national armaments, imposing
caps on national budgetary expenditure on defense, and prohibiting the use of poison gas in
wartime.51 One successful initiative was to provide open data on national armaments. The
Disarmament Section of the Secretariat prepared an annual Armaments Yearbook, compiled from
open sources, that described the strength and equipment of the armed forces of more than 60
countries, along with the size of their defense budgets and their industrial production in materials
of military use. 52 In his contribution to the book, Webster recognizes that disarmament operated
internationally, and it did not fail or succeed in a vacuum.
As activists watched the League of Nations stumble, many found themselves allying with
the various peace movements emerging at the time as alternatives, such as the disarmament or
outlawry movements. While Levinson was always focused on his plan to outlaw war, he did not
work without appreciation of or contact with the disarmament movement. Like supporters of the
movement to disarm, Levinson saw the advantages to a world with fewer armaments; he just
believed that disarmament had to be folded in with outlawry: it could not stand alone. WWI had
disrupted the planned meeting the Third Hague Conference, now key figures pushed for the
conference to be called in 1920 in order to create and codify international law. Among other
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reforms, proponents of a meeting wanted the conference to touch on disarmament. Similar to the
League's Covenant, supporters of disarmament wanted laws that mandated "national armaments
shall be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and with the necessities of
international requirements."53 However, people like Levinson realized that disarmament would
be impossible while war was still prominent in the structure of how nations interacted.
Levinson hoped that eventually the world would be able to tum to disarmament and come
to a point where international relations were strong enough to rule without the aid of armaments.
In a letter Levinson received in 1929, it read "if war is not outlawed, each side must and will ask
for those armaments which it thinks will give it victory when the war comes."54 This letter
reflected his beliefs as well that more peace work had to take place before disarmament could be
implemented. Throughout Levinson's work as a peace activist, he stood by the belief that
disarmament would have to come after the efforts to outlaw war and create an international code.
In a speech promoting outlawry in 1924, Levinson said "the inherent difficulty of procuring
disarmament is the virtual impossibility of getting a general agreement among nations so long as
the war system is the lawful and authoritative method of settling disputes."55 He recognized the
importance of disarmament, but believed it would be difficult to get the powerful nations of the
world to agree to lowering armaments while war remained an integral part of the global system.
Philip

Kerr wrote in a letter

in 1929 that for the outlawing of war to work effectively it had to be

"coupled with a reduction of armaments to the level at which they cease to threaten the existence
of neighbors."56 Levinson never forgot how important disarmament was in combination to his
goal of outlawry. In 1924, he declared that "Disarmament is the crying need of the world, but
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disarmament cannot effectively take place until we smash the war system."57 From the moment
that he conceived of his plan for peace, Levinson felt that outlawry had to be the absolute focus
of the drive for a permanent peace, even as he recognized the importance of other movements
like disarmament.

57
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Chapter Two
This chapter examines Levinson's outlawry plan and the different aspects that comprise
outlawry. He spent years revising his plan and making it as clear as possible. This chapter then
examines the evolution of what outlawry grew to be in Levinson's eyes. It examines the term
outlawry itself, and how Levinson came to use and define his movement. The chapter also
explains the three aspects of outlawry in the legality of war, the definition of war, and the
establishment of an international court and code. The plan of outlawry was complex as there
were many different parts that Levinson was constantly reworking to make clearer and prevent
his points from being misapplied or misused. This chapter seeks to explain his plan and
differentiate it from the movements supporting the League of Nations and disarmament as
explained in the first chapter. Chapter Two also shows the boundless work Levinson put into his
peace plan to make it the most comprehensive and intelligent proposal that was circulating in the
years following World War I.
Salmon Le':'._inson was late coming onto the scene of international politics. Indeed, he had
not always been concerned with the matters of other countries. However, in the wake of postwar
chaos, he quickly developed a program that focused on laws and the legality of war which he
would refine in his years working toward peace. His plan was different than the other plans
emerging at the same time--disarmament proposals, the League of Nations, or other variations
as Levinson's did not assume the legality of war as the existing plans did and he did not work

58

under the premise that war was legitimate.

Levinson saw his plan as separate from the League

because it was not based on the power of alliances or qualities of force, but instead was to be a
peaceful organization of civilized nations ruled by law and a comprehensive code, both of which
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59 As he outlined it,

would be administered by a world court.

Levinson's outlawry plan included:

a general treaty with civilized nations to abolish war by making it a criminal offense;
establishing a code of international law based on equality of nations and justice; and an
international court with independence and affirmative jurisdiction.60 An article in

1 92 9 considers

the term "outlawry," which Levinson coined to promote his peace plan. "The term "outlawry" is
just the right one-it was a piece of profound and shrewd insight to clothe the idea in a term so
precise and yet so picturesque," read the article.61 Levinson would repeatedly explain his plan
and why it was the strongest way to peace, but it was the introduction of the term "outlawry"
itself that would allow Levinson to come to the world stage as a major player in the peace game.
Levinson outlined how to achieve peace, but he realized that he would be fighting an
uphill battle to gain the support he needed for outlawry. In 1921 he told his friend William Hard
that he had come to the conclusion "it is impossible to get governments as at present constituted
to take any interest in the outlawry of war" because he knew that many governments were
concerned with only what would benefit them the most following WWI.6 2 It was Levinson's
strong commitment, and belief, that outlawry was the right way to achieve peace that kept him
going, even if he felt that he did not have the support of governments. In a letter to Senator
William

E.

Borah (R-ID), a citizen from Kansas wrote, "all who are really interested in

civilization agree, and have long agreed, that war is the most stupendous wrong that the human
race has devised, and yet they continue to approve and employ it."63 Feelings such as those
expressed in the letter to Borah were at the center ofLevinson's movement, as he wondered at
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how war was able to survive into the modern world. According to his close friend Unitarian
minister and peace activist John Haynes Holmes, Levinson once said that "war exists
pragmatically as a means of settling disputes between nations, and persists in spite of all its
destructive horrors, because it is the only existing means of settling such disputes" and war as a
solution to conflicts was what Levinson wanted to banish.64 It would be important for Levinson's
goal of outlawing war for the world to see that problem with the legality of war, and how
changing laws would be the most effective way to avoid another war.
Levinson discovered, in his years working toward outlawry, that many people did not
look at war as legal or illegal: they simply saw it as something that was bad and should be
regulated so there would not be a repeat of WWI. In 1921, he wrote, "Civilization has been
marked in its upward trend out of savagery into its present condition by the evolution of law and
courts to supplant methods of violence and force."65 As society modernized, Levinson
concluded, it turned to courts and law as the solution for violence. "Civilization has outlawed
every form of violence for the settlement of human disputes except only wars between nations,"
he explained.66

In

these two parallel comments on civilization and how it handles violence,

Levinson explained that citizens could move past war, and, it him, it was a wonder that somehow
war between nations had escaped the use of laws to rid the world of violence. Levinson
recognized that one of the ways that war has been able to survive was due to its integration into
the very makeup of society, making it difficult-but not impossible-to do away with
international war. "War is an institution. An institution is a custom not contrary to law
established over long periods among peoples and races," he wrote in 1921, explaining that
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although war had a long history, it was not immune to the new power that he felt law was
achieving in the twentieth century.67 Levinson questioned how, especially after WWI, anyone
would not want to outlaw war. In his pamphlet introducing Outlawry to the American public, he
wrote,
Whatever values wars may have had in the past, these last years have shown
modem war to be so terrible an instrument, so far reaching in its destruction and
the results of that destruction, that its use in our closely interdependent present day civilization jeopardizes the very life of that civilization.68
World War I convinced Levinson that international war should not be able to exist legally,
because it was from the law that he believed that war drew its strength. "War, instead of being
allowed to remain legal, should be declared illegal. War instead of being legally honorable,
should be declared legally criminal," explained Levinson of the ideas at the very center of his
outlawry vision.69 It was in the legality of war that Levinson thought the first attacks against the
war system needed to take place, and he would spend years advocating for laws ag_ainst war.
As a lawyer, it follows that Levinson would become most concerned with the legality of
war and how war operated as a system under the guise of international law. In an article written
in 1918 called "The Legal Status of War," Levinson asserted, "In one case as the other, we want
not laws of war, but laws against war, just as we have laws against murder, not laws of
murder."70 Here Levinson makes clear his basic approach to making laws concerning war. He
truly believed that part of the danger that war held was that it appeared a perfectly legitimate
solution to problems under the law.
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said, "so long as war remains a lawful institution and the available right for settlement of
disputes real, fancied or imperialistic, so long will war surely break out in the world."71 This
view that war would persist while it remained legal would be Levinson's constant argument as
he tried to convert people to the premise that outlawry was the best peace option available. In a
memo he produced about the principles of outlawry, Levinson wrote "war will continue to
dominate and control international relations unless .. .it is deinstitutionalized and de-legalized by
a new basic international law of peace."72 Levinson had believed, along with much of the world,
that the ending of WWI would also be the end of global wars and the destruction they wrought.
However, he watched as the League failed to live up to its promises of peace, and how other
peace movements like disarmament were unable to gain the traction they would need to succeed
in securing peace. "Has the crusading promise made to our boys, dead, wounded and
unwounded, been made to the ear, only to be broke to the hope?" he wondered, echoing the
sentiments of many people disappointed by the peace proceedings following WWI.73 In

1923,

Senator Borah wrote, "The world has lately passed th{_ough a baptism of blood and practically all
the troubles now with us are the result of that war. "74 These such sentiments would create a space
for Levinson to disseminate his outlawry plans. Levinson would bring to the world's attention
the legality of war and would spent years convincing the population that the way to peace was
through the law as it offered the only absolute solution.
An important aspect of Levinson's outlawry work was how he understood war and how
he saw the term used or referenced in different nations. His theory, that was at the foundation of
outlawry, was: war as an institution for settling controversies should be declared by the nations
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of the world to be illegal, and that any territorial changes resulting from war would have no legal
value.75 Levinson, in his definition of outlawry, was always hesitant to define the different types
of law and explain why some were different or may be more accepted than others. He did write,
A war between nations is, and always has been perfectly legitimate . . . This is not
true of a war within a nation, a war of liberation, a revolutionary war; for this is
high treason, whereas a war of aggression and conquest remains immune from
legal attack.76
Levinson wrote in a letter to Philip Kerr in 1929 that the phrase "defensive wars" was "an old,
subtle, mischievous, outworn, but in a sense typical, international term," all of which reflected
his dislike of attempts made to distinguish between different types of war.77 He also took issue
with those who would constantly argue that war was inherently tied to the right of self-defense,
and that to go on the offensive against attack came under the same right as defending one's
nation. In his memo outlining outlawry, Levinson retorted, "The inherent right of self-defense
should not be confused w:ith the subtle and manipulated distinction between an offensive and a
defensive war."78 The distinction between a defensive war, offensive war, and self-defense
would be a source of consistent criticism brought against Levinson's outlawry. Thus, Levinson
frequently made this case. For instance, in a talk about outlawry in

1924,

Levinson reiterated,

"The right of self-defense by a nation, does not constitute war any more than the individual right
of self-defense constitutes murder."79 In another instance where Levinson was writing about the
supposed differences between wars, he explained, "a man defending himself against an attack is
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not a duelist and a nation defending itself from attack or invasion would not be doing an act of
war," here again referencing claims that outlawry prohibited self-defense. 80 There were certain
aspects of outlawry that Levinson had to constantly defend or reinterpret so people understood
his aim of harnessing the law to delegitimize war as a whole.
Levinson created a plan for outlawry that he felt could answer all of the concerns and
qualms that might be raised, while also setting up a system that could develop with changing
times, with a focus on a court of peace. He wrote in a pamphlet about outlawry that, "war has
been and still is a sacred institution used by nations as a court, a cruel, destructive court," but it
was the idea that war acted as a sort of international court that Levinson found troubling.81 When
crafting outlawry, Levinson split his idea into three important points: Outlawry speci fically, an
international code, and a global court.82 Writing to Borah in

1922,

Levinson claimed, "our

proposition is one to cover merely the inevitable disputes that, so long as human nature is as it is,
will arise among the nations and must get settled somehow, either by war or by law," explaining

,_

the necessity of the court. 83 Levinson also wrote that the outlawry proposal included the
"application of the system of comprehensive laws and a real court to the field of international
controversies," and that it would operate under the assumption of peace, not war.84 He
understood that while he did not want to specify the different between aggressive and defensive
war, he could not stop others from trying to make the distinction. In terms of enforcement,
Levinson wrote in

1923

that the "international court might be given summary jurisdiction to hear

and decide whether a given attack by one nation on another is justified or provoked," which
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would satisfy those who felt there had to be support against attack.85 He believed in the power of
the court, but knew that it was only after war was outlawed that "a real court can be erected with
judicial power over the legitimate law suits of the nations and their grievances and disputes," and
that it was the two points of his program combined that would lead to a lasting peace.86 Levinson
put most of his effort and work into refining outlawry and firmly establishing his points for the
program, such as the international court.
Levinson knew that creating an international court would be no small task; he would have
to compete with the interests of powerful countries and leaders who felt that they knew what was
best for the world. In

192 1

he wrote that the use of force of arms to settle disputes between

nations was largely due to the lack of courts and laws in the international field.87 Levinson was
constantly working to make the world court the best that it could be, admitting in

192 8

that "the

effort should be made to improve the instruments of arbitration and judicial procedure," all in the
attempt to replace war entirely.88 The very heart of the organization of the world court, Levinson
believed, should be based off on the Supreme Court of the United States, specifically in the way
it held jurisdiction over disputes between states without the use of force. 89 In explaining this
idea, he wrote that the Supreme Court "in decrees and judgments against States is supposed to
have no power and has never exercised any power to enforce them," yet the States carried out the
decisions in over forty cases without any force needed.90 Just as the states do in the United
States, Levinson's plan counted on "all nations shall agree to abide and be bound by and in good
faith to carry out the orders, decrees and decisions of such Court" and the cooperation between
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nations allowing the court to function well.91 Levinson harrowed elements of his plan from
working courts, such as the US Supreme Court, and applied them to the international court he
was building in order to create a high -functioning judicial system.
In describing the court that would accompany outlawry, Levinson laid out specifics of
how the court should be run and operate effectively as a global institution. While the court would
be closely modeled on the US Supreme Court and much of its ability depends on the promise of
nations, Levinson also thought it should have plenary power to enforce judgements against the
criminal violators of the international code.92 Regarding other aspects of how the court would
function, Levinson wrote that "the court should sit in the hemisphere of the contending nations;
and if the disputants live in opposite hemispheres, then in the hemisphere of the defendant
nation."93 He also proposed that the corresponding code, which would help lay out the laws and
precedents of the court, be amended and brought to date every five years so that new points
could be covered or added to the international code.94 As Levinson's main motivator for getting
involved in international politics was his work at a lawyer and the issue of war's legality,_ the
idea of the global court as an important factor to outlawry cannot be dismissed.
Another important facet to the outlawry plan that Levinson was questioned about on
multiple occasions was how force and armaments should be considered in outlawry. While
Levinson often changed his mind on the matter of force, in 1923 he wrote, "any scheme by
which peace is to be procured by force, whether it is called balance of power, preponderance of
power, defensive alliance, or any other name, is merely perpetuating the vicious cycle of war,"
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making i t clear that b y that time, he was firmly against using force t o secure peace.95 In order to
cope with the existence of armaments in the world, outlawry called for "a safeguard of sworn
statements of armaments, military and naval, structural and chemical, to be made at least once a
year by each nation," so that way no one nation could build up on armaments and threaten the
international state of peace.96 In Levinson's plan for outlawry, he took a note from the League
Covenant, writing that it was necessary for "national armaments to be reduced to the lowest point
consistent with domestic safety."97 In

1923,

Levinson wrote, "the peace of the world must be

worked out as between nations in terms of law, equality and j ustice, and not in terms of force."98
It was incredibly important to Levinson that it was not force or armaments that ruled the
international stage, but instead that a system of law and order was the ultimate decider in global
conflicts.

95
96
97
98

Salmon Levinson to Philip Kerr, 24 February 1923, Box 26, Folder 2, Levinson Papers.
Salmon Levinson, Outlawry of War analysis, 11January 1924, Box 29, Folder 7, Levinson Papers.
Salmon Levinson, Outlawry Pamphlet, n.d. Box 29, Folder 8, Levinson Papers.
Salmon Levinson to Philip Kerr, 24 February 1923, Box 26, Folder 2, Levinson Papers.

29
Chapter Three
This chapter covers Levinson's allies and how he preferred to work through other people
committed to outlawry, as he wanted to stay out of the international spotlight and work behind
the scenes. The focus of the chapter is on Levinson's close partnership with both Senator
Philander C. Knox and Senator William

E.

Borah. It also considers his faith in the public and his

belief that outlawry would succeed because of its popular support. Levinson spent a lot of time
writing letters to his allies and asking for help refining outlawry, as well as gaining their public
support. In his work with Senator Knox and Senator Borah, Levinson was looking for allies in
the Senate, men who could introduce his plan in a governmental setting and campaign for
outlawry. This chapter also deals heavily with Levinson's absolute faith that the general
population of the world did not want war and would support his movement to make it illegal. He
believed that the way to delegitimize war was to show people that they had the power to
renounce war and force their governments to outlaw war. Chapter Three introduces Levinson's
desire to build outlawry out of �?operation with powerful men and the belief that in the end,
outlawry would be a people's movement.
Levinson did not create the plan for outlawry on his own. He cultivated relationships with
powerful men so he could combine their intelligence to build the most comprehensive peace plan
as possible. After he became interested in the state of international affairs following World War
I, Levinson had the feeling that he needed to speak with Senator Knox.99 Senator Philander C.
Knox was Levinson's first ally in his crusade to outlaw war, and was incredibly important
because together they created the foundation of outlawry that Levinson would build on in his
years as a peace activist. Senator Knox was a senator from Pennsylvania, and had served as the
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attorney general and Secretary o f State in two different presidential cabinets. 1 00 Under President
Theodore Roosevelt he worked for the prosecution of the anti -trust law and created a turning
point in American financing and corporation policy. 1 01 Knox specialize in corporate law and was
once described as "the law on two legs," along with another person saying it was difficult to
think of Knox as anything but a lawyer. 1 02 It may have been their shared work in law,
specifically corporate and finance law, that originally brought Levinson and Knox together to
work on outlawry. Knox was also an intellectual leader of a group which first called attention to
the defects of the League covenant and voiced resistance to changes that would be brought to the
United States by joining the League. 1 03 In Knox, Levinson found not only an ally who
understood the importance and power of the law, but who was also openly against the League.
Levinson had found someone who could help to create a plan to oppose the League and fight
against those that would trick the United States to join an empty organization.
Levinson was excited when he found that Knox had similar sentiments about the
pro\eedings in Europe, especially those at the Paris Peace Conference. Senator Knox made a
speech in

19 19,

which was the first public reference to outlawry made by governmental official,

and his speech also featured an attack on the Covenant of the League of Nations. 104 The first
draft treaty for outlawry would come from the conversations between Knox and Levinson, as the
two men reshaped and refined their individual ideas about the legality of war.105 It was with the
help of Knox that Levinson would come to the belief that outlawry could be possible without the
use of force. Knox looked at records of arbitration and court awards, finding that no countries
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refused to carry out the judicial decrees, leading him to the belief that outlawry did not need
police force to function.106 Levinson and Knox worked on their plan for outlawry, giving it to
people such as Senator Borah to read, hoping for feedback or support on the proposition. After
reading the plan, Borah had said to Knox "I consider this plan admirable and if you will offer it I
will support it with all the power I have," and to get the support of Borah was not a small task for
the two men.107 Levinson worked closely with Senator Knox until his death in 1921, at which
time he was forced to look for a new spokesperson in the Senate who could help him introduce
outlawry.108 Senator Knox played an important role in helping Levinson craft the very
foundation of outlawry, and was vital to the beginning of the movement and all that it developed
into.
Levinson preferred not to be on the mainstage; he instead liked to have his allies speak
publicly in support of outlawry. Therefore, after the death sudden of Senator Knox, Levinson
knew that he needed new support in the Senate, so he turned much of his attention to Senator
Borah of Idaho. Senator Borah was never president-not for lack of trying-but he remained a
mighty figure in national and international affairs, serving as outspoken member of the senate. 1 09
Borah was a relentless foe of the League of Nations and the World Court, never giving in to
compromise. 1 10 He rejected the Versailles Treaty when it came to the United States and fought
against League supporters to keep the US out of the organization. 1 1 1 Borah challenged League
advocates to come into the open and lay all the facts about the organization on the table so the
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American people had a chance to make an informed judgment.112 His largest dispute with the
League was the idea that the organization would preserve peace by force, as he believed that
there could be no true peace procured by force.113 In

1924,

Senator Borah became the chairman

of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, giving him a more powerful position to rej ect the
attempts to force the United States into the League.114 It was his high position in the Senate, his
clear distrust of the League, and his determination to find a peace solution that was not founded
in force that made Senator Borah the perfect ally for Levinson. He would write hundreds of
letters to convince Senator Borah of the merits of outlawry, and it would prove to be the right
decision for Levinson's plan.
Convincing Senator Borah proved no small task. Borah would not promote any peace
plan that rested on the idea of force, and because of his strong convictions he gained a reputation
for being against everything, not for anything. 1 15 Even when Levinson had convinced Borah to
join the fight for outlawry, the senator did not make it easy and would only support the best
peace plan Levinson had to offer. He wrote to Levinson in

1922,

"we ought to put our case so .

.

completely on paper, even at the expense of being a little bit prolix, that it cannot be
misconstrued or misapplied," and he consistently forced Levinson to redefine his ideas so that
they were more clear and concise.116 While in that past Borah had been more connected to the
disarmament movement, he decided that outlawry had its benefits because attacking the war
system by outlawing warfare was "an incalculable contribution" to international security.11 7 One
of the characteristics of his friendship with Borah that Levinson appreciated was that he did

112

Arthur Evan, "U.S. Betrayed in League Trap, Borah Warns: 12,000 Cheer Old Washington Policy," Chicago

Daily Tribune, February 23 , 1926.
113

Henning,Jan 20, 1940.
Henning,Jan 20, 1940.
115
Ferrell, 33.
116
William Borah to Salmon Levinson, 29 November 1922, Box 3, Folder 16, Levinson Papers.
117
Ferrell, 168.

114

33
challenge him frequently and made him answer hard questions about outlawry. Levinson
welcomed criticism of his ideas because it caused him to think critically about what he was
proposing, and in the long run allowed him to profit and build a stronger defense of outlawry.118
Outside of their outlawry work-and one of the reasons he chose Borah as an ally-Levinson
respected the senator immensely, writing in

1923,

"again it is confirmed to me that there is no

one at all a match for you in debate in the Senate." 1 1 9 Senator Borah was not always the easiest
ally to work with, but Levinson wanted him because of his political power and intelligence.
As Levinson and Borah proposed to bring outlawry to the attention of the United States
government, Levinson often had to leave the responsibility to Borah who would have to
introduce outlawry in some form in the Senate. Levinson worked to convince Borah of the
validity of his views, writing to him in

1 923,

"let me say that I am not attempting to force my

amateur political judgement on you and am only hoping that on reflection my views may meet,
at least to some extent, with your approval."120 He would write several letters to Borah a month,
sometimes multiple in a week, increasing pressure on Borah to con.tribute to his outlawry
pamphlet, and bring the issue to the Senate floor. 12 1 In a near constant battle with political
developments, it seemed that every time Levinson had sufficiently convinced Borah to introduce
an

outlawry resolution, there would be a political reason that the men felt it was not the right

time. After the failure of setting up an international court through the League-which was
largely due to manipulations and maneuvers of different nations' diplomats-Levinson felt
"Borah, who is pretty well worn out, will want to stage his outlawry speech in such an
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environment," and it appeared that there was a constant stream of setbacks to outlawry.122 Then
finally on February 15,

1923

Senator Borah introduced an outlawry resolution for consideration,

but did not give a speech about outlawry as he had promised Levinson he would. 123 In a letter
sent the next month, Borah wrote as explanation that there was no opportunity to adequately
discuss the resolution and that to do so inadequately would be a mistake. 1 24 It may have taken
longer than anticipated, an outlawry resolution was finally introduced in the Senate, and
Levinson knew that he had picked a strong ally in Senator Borah.
In combination with his desire to work with men in high places, Levinson also believed
that outlawry was above all a people's movement, so he spent time teaching the world about
outlawry. As a part of a memo about outlawry, Levinson wrote "the riddance of war will be the
crystallization of the will of the people into law; hence the indispensable importance of
worldwide education on this subject" and he would do his part in educating people on
outlawry. 1 25 On December

9, 1921

Levinson and some associates organized the American

Committee for the Outlawry of War, a,._committee name he used to publish and disseminate his
position on the legality of war.126 Levinson explained the purpose of the committee, and the
outlawry movement, in a pamphlet,
Our Committee is proposing to educate the world to the proposition that the war
system, founded upon force and violence, should be supplanted and superseded
by a judicial system founded upon treaties and codes of law with the institution of
war abolished and destroyed root and branch.127
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After beginning his committee for outlawry, Levinson made a few attempts to raise money, but
he did not want to take money for fear of interference with his authority over the outlawry
movement. 1 28 Despite wanting to keep people from having influence over the movement because
of financial contributions, Levinson also tried to convince people that outlawry was the only
solution to the war problem. In an article about Levinson, it reads "he never exhausts this peace
topic. He never finished importuning his hearers until they are out of earshot. He never wastes an
opportunity to make a convert," because he recognized the importance of popular support for the
success of outlawry.129 Levinson used the power of his committee to spread his ideas and reach
the general public that he would not have been able speak to directly. He understood and deeply
believed in the power of people as necessary to gaining traction for a worldwide movement.
It was not just through his committee work that Levinson sought to rally public support
for and understanding of outlawry. He truly believed that the success of outlawry was founded in
the average citizen of the world and the desire of non-governmental citizens for a warless world.
He wrote

i_n a letter to

the major premise that

Senator Borah in

95%

1923

explaining that, "our whole proposition rest upon

of the civilized people of the world are against the bloody

institutions of war." 1 30 Levinson also pointed out that it was difficult for public opinion to
function against war while it was lawful and warranted which put the burden on people to show
why war was not justi fied. 1 31 It was in outlawry that people could find proof that war was not
legitimate or needed internationally. Levinson did not have much faith in the governments of the
world to look past their own interests and do what was best for the world. In

1921

he wrote, "in

the end the appeals will have to be made to the peoples of the various countries and through them
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b y new governmental officials or otherwise, t o compel the adoption o f a policy that amounts to
the abolition of warfare."132 Levinson only truly counted on nations to be against war when it fit
a government's self-interest. In similar sentiments, Philip Kerr wrote, "the one vital interest of all
nations in all parts of the world is to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, for war, like a prairie fire,
is uncontrollable and may spread anywhere."133 Even as Levinson worked toward outlawry
through an international treaty, he still believed power rested in the population of the signing
nations, not with the governments. He wrote in 1924 that if a country was slow to sign a treaty to
outlaw war that "a campaign among their own peoples who of right should decide the matter, as
they pay the cost of wars in money and blood. " 1 34 Levinson understood the importance of
cultivating relationships with intellectuals in powerful political and social positions, but he
believed that the strength of outlawry was rooted in the public's aversion to war.
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Chapter Four
Chapter Four examines the Kellogg -Briand Pact, the successes and failures of outlawry,
and the legacy Levinson left behind. The Kellogg -Brian� Pact is arguably the biggest success of
the outlawry movement a treaty signed by numerous nations agreeing to make war illegal. This
chapter looks at Levinson's part in creating the Pact and how he felt about the proceedings. Even
though the Kellogg-Briand Pact was adopted by over

50

nations, it did not prevent World War II,

so this chapter considers Levinson's reaction to the failure of the outlawry movement and his
response to the renewal of war in Europe. While World War II would put a near definite end to
outlawry, Levinson did not lose complete hope. He still thought that people would come back to
the idea of making war illegitimate and the power remained with popular support. Levinson left
behind the story of an individual who was so determined to make a difference and introduce the
premise of a lawful peace that he should not be forgotten. This chapter ends by explaining
Levinson's legacy and how he changed the world in his peace efforts in outlawry.
The great victory of the outlawry movement was the passing of the Kellogg -Briand Pact,
even though the extent to which it might be deemed successful is questionable. Levinson had a
large part in the creation of the pact and campaigning for the passage of the treaty. Secretary of
State Frank B. Kellogg asked Levinson to prepare a draft treaty based on his experiences and
contact with the French Foreign Office, and Levinson made up a draft which he forwarded to
Kellogg's office. 1 35 Even more than just writing the draft, Levinson put forth extreme effort
behind the scenes to get both the United States government and the French government onboard
for the outlawry treaty. He had to educate Kellogg to the idea of outlawry, convince his
colleagues that the treaty proposal coming from French diplomat Aristide Briand was not
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dangerous, and to change the isolationist mindset to many Americans to ones of cooperation and
support in regard to international relations.136 Briand announced in early 1927 that France was
ready to conclude an agreement with the United States to outlaw war and settle the differences
between the two nations with a bilateral treaty. However, Kellogg was not as willing to be tied so
closely to France, so he suggested that they instead put forward a multilateral treaty all nations
could adopt, not just the US and France.137 The pact would outlaw war. Negotiations between
Kellogg and Briand were facilitated by Levinson, and it was not easy work to convince the two
diplomats to work together towards the goal of outlawry.
The Kellogg -Briand Pact was the great diplomatic achievement of the outlawry
movement, and Levinson did his share to make the dream of a multilateral treaty outlawing war a
reality. In a

1 929

article "A Chicago Lawyer's One -Man War Against War" about Levinson' s

peace work, written by M.W. Childs o f the Post -Dispatch Staff, Childs claimed that justice
would be done if the Kellogg -Briand Pact was called the Levinson pact. The article concluded
that, "it is this one man who has moved mountains to bring it into being,''.. and many people
"
recognized that the pact would not exist without Levinson's help and the foundation of the
outlawry movement.138 After nearly three months of dodging, Briand, in the name of France,
finally accepted the principle of a multilateral treaty renouncing war. On the American side of
negotiations, Kellogg invited Italy, Japan, Germany, and Great Britain to enter the antiwar
discussion by way of a draft treaty in April

1 927. 139 The Kellogg -Briand Pact renouncing war as

an instrument of national policy was signed August 27,

136

1928,

by

63

different nations.140
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Levinson was finally seeing his years of hard work pay off, as the world seemed well on its way
to signing a multi -national treaty that rejected the legality of war and looked to non -aggressive
conflict resolution.
As the world watched the negotiations for the Kellogg -Briand Pact, there was
international hope that there might finally be an end to war. Levinson saw that the law could be
powerful and if one could push past diplomatic red tape, that a treaty resulting from outlawry
would bene fit the world. He thought that the Kellogg -Briand Pact "sounds the death-knell of war
as an institution, as a method of settling international disputes," and that through it, outlawry had
found its official home.141 In

1928,

Levinson wrote that he hoped the League of Nations would

approve "the Kellogg treaty and adopting the Outlawry of War as the fundamental as well as the
ultimate objective of the League," which shows that he believed that the treaty was powerful
enough to even redeem the League.142 On January

16, 1929

the General Treaty for the

Renunciations of War-also known as the Paris Peace Pact, the Briand -Kellogg Pact, and the
Kellogg -Briand Pact-passed the Senate witQ a vote of 85 to 1 after Senator Borah gave it
vigorous support.143 Regardless of how much work Levinson himself put into the creation of the
treaty that would become the Kellogg -Briand Pact, he would write in 1928, "we must admit that
the Kellogg proposal would never have seen the light of day if Briand had not started the ball
rolling."144 Once the treaty was finalized, it had been initially signed by Great Britain, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium and "gave a sound diplomatic basis
for action in each case and gave diplomats con fidence in the support of public opinion."145 While
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there was widespread excitement at the possibility of the Kellogg -Briand Pact and what it meant
for the state of war in the world, Levinson would soon find that outlawry would not be able to
stand up in the world left behind after the Great War.
Even though Levinson had faith in outlawry and its ability to put an end to war, he also
understood how WWI had changed the world in way that it may not be ready for outlawry. In a
letter in 1929 to Levinson, Philip Kerr voiced his concern about the Kellogg-Briand Pact by
writing, "history seems to show that treaties of this kind, which provide no machinery to ensure
their own execution, rapidly lose potency over public opinion unless they are implemented in
some definite way." 1 46 Levinson wrote a letter in 192 9 stating, "it is pretty difficult for people
writhing under the burdens of sixty years of future debts to get enthusiastic on the subject of
world peace," making it clear that he was aware of the limitations people were put under due to
World War I and its aftermath.147 He specifically mentioned Germany in a letter in 1923 writing,
It was a little much to ask defeated Germany to punish its war criminals when no
la�s against war had ever been enacted, and when the people of Germany
themselves had been penalized beyond all precedent in history.14

8

Even before the Kellogg -Braid Pact was an idea, Levinson was concerned about the effect WWI
would have on any peace proceedings that were attempted. Levinson was proud of the treaty that
had come from outlawry, but he did not believe that it was the solution to all of the world's
problems, especially those resulting from war.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact and outlawry movement may not have done exactly what
Levinson envisioned, but the Pact did change aspects of international relations creating a new
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world system. In a speech Levinson gave in 1939, he said, "a neutral nation has heretofore
always meant a nation that was not in a war that was being carried on by other nations."149 He
reflected on the ways that war terms transformed and that being neutral in a war did not mean the
same thing after World War I. Philip Kerr, ten years earlier in 1929, had written, "the logic of the
Outlawry of War movement implies the complete disappearance of the old issues of belligerent
versus neutral rights."150 Levinson had to eventually grapple with the fact that outlawry had not
erased the idea of belligerent and neutral nations. The changes in the legal rules regarding war
did not stop states from seizing land-such as Japan taking Manchuria-but possession was no
longer enough to establish legal rights and other states rejected those seizures as illegitimate.151
The fact that nations did not necessarily recognize a country' s authority simply because it had
invaded a piece of land reaffirmed the break with the past represented by the Pact, even if that
was not an intended consequence by the framers.
However, one of the biggest perceived failures of the Kellogg -Briand Pact was that
making war illegal did not stop the second world war from taking place. Levinson watched as
Europe seemed to be headed for another global conflict and contemplated what the United States
role would be in this foreign war. In a speech in 193 9, he said "America cannot be deaf, dumb
and blind to all that goes on in this world" and "there are two ways of getting into war: one is by
being too brash and the other is by being too cowardly. My country should be neither."152
Levinson had worked incredibly hard to get a treaty passed outlawing war, then had to watch the
world return to war and had to reevaluate his stance on war and the morality of respecting the
treaty to stay out of war.
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As war neared, it can be difficult to see the successes in Levinson's outlawry movement.
However, Levinson left behind a legacy of peace and hope for a brighter future free from the
institution of war. After the signing of the Kellogg-Brain Pact, Levinson wrote that August 2 7
should become a World Peace Holiday. Once w ar was outlawed, he declared, "I don't believe we
will have any international law -breakers, alias bandit nations, alias aggressor nations," because
he truly believed in the affect his peace work would have on the world.153 John Haynes Holmes,
an associate of Levinson's, stated "On this day, each year, so long as civilization endures, let this
renunciation be solemnly and gratefully renewed, not by statemen but by the peoples
themselves."154 Although Holmes used August 28, the two men were both thinking of a
celebration for the Kellogg -Briand Pact. The pact clearly was not successful as Levinson had
hoped, however, it was still a victory as it was the first time that the nations of the world got
together and really spoke of the legality of war. The discussion also brought the issue of
outlawry to the attention of the public and made it a people's movement. Levinson wrote about
the Pact, "upon these things I base my optimism for the future, once we make the people realize,
upon the universal ratification of the Pact, that the power is in them."155 Levinson always saw
incredible strength in the power of the people. Even though WWII would not be far away,
outlawry did not accomplish nothing: it led to a global revolution where aggressive war can be a
prosecuted crime in the international court.156 The Kellogg -Briand Pact may not have been able
to convince the world to stop the use of war, but it did bring the question of legality to people
and governments who had not previously seen law as a foundation of peace.
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Levinson may not be a well -known name outside of academia, but he left an impression
on the people he worked with, and was not easily forgotten. Frank Hayes wrote a letter to
Levinson in 1928 asking, "would it be proper at this time to tell of your part in conferences with
Briand and Kellogg, as the direct instigator of such a multilateral treaty?" 157 His associates
wanted him to get the recognition that he deserved for all of the work he did not just in getting
the Kellogg -Briand Pact signed, but just in the massive amount of effort he put into outlawry.
When it came time for the Nobel Peace Prize winner to be chosen, both close friends and casual
acquaintances of Levinson nominated him and joined the drive to get him the prize that they felt
he rightly deserved. 1 58 The article "A Chicago Lawyer's One -Man War Against War" praises
Levinson as a peace prophet and urges that he should receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his
momentous labor in bringing outlawry to the world.159 Levinson would not end up getting the
Nobel Peace Prize, as it would go to Kellogg and Briand for their negotiations of the Pact. It was
not surprising, as it would have been difficult for the Nobel committee to pass over an official
who was connected with the actual negotiations of the treaty for a private citize� for work on the
same treaty.160 Levinson was not upset by losing the prize, as he had always preferred to stay out
of the public light. In a letter to one of the men who had campaigned in Levinson's name, he
wrote "I feel as if I had received glory enough without competing with Mr. Kellogg who,
according to precedents, is at least politically entitled to the big reward."161 It was through his
associates that Levinson felt he had achieved the most, by distilling the idea of peace and
bringing people over the idea that outlawry could work.
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In the face of WWII Levinson never lost hope that the world could find its way back to
pace and that outlawing war was the right first step. If nothing else entered the public's mind and
consciousness-such as the Code and Court that Levinson worked hard to create and promoteat the very least the idea of outlawing war became a common idea in America and many other
parts of the world.162 On his seventieth birthday, the Chicago Sinai Congregation wished
Levinson a happy birthday and said,
The world has not yet learned to "outlaw war," as he so ardently desired. His
immediate contribution, therefore, to our day is a contribution of the history of
ethics rather than to the history of international relations. The nations of the world
have, because of him, learned to speak of international relations ethically. 1 63
Levinson believed so completely that peace was possible, that he was able to convince others
that there was a way for a better world to be made. He always claimed it depended on everyone,
not just governments, to make peace a reality. As he witnessed Europe heading for another
global conflict, he wrote that the United States sho,_Id stay committed to the Kellogg -Briand Pact
and not enter into a war if it should come to that. However, he also wrote in

1 92 8

that the US

should,
Help guide the suffering peoples of the world, including our own, into the path of
peace, comfort, and contentment. In this way alone can universal peace be
attained. For the flower of peace cannot grow except in the soil of peace; and the
world has not cultivated the soil of peace since the Great War. 1 64
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He had faith in people and their ability to become better, for the world to grow tired of war and
begin to understand that an idea such as outlawry could save them from destruction. Levinson
also knew the limitations of his movement, writing in 1928, "the greatest difficulty we have,
living as we do in a war-world, filled with war traditions, is to visualize a warless world," but he
did not let those limitations dishearten him.165 Salmon Levinson never stopped hoping and
pushing for the day that war would be outlawed and the world could move into a peaceful
existence governed by laws and the will of the people.
Salmon Levinson is not a prominent historical figure despite all of the work he did in the
interwar years aimed towards a lasting peace. He forged relationships with people in important
and powerful positions, such as creating peace plans with Senator Knox and forming a Senate
resolution with Senator Borah. Levinson preferred to work behind the scenes, convincing people
that his peace plan was vital and then letting his associates become advocates for the cause. He
believed that war, as terrible as it was, should be against the law, and by outlawing it, war would
lose its legitimacy in in.�emational affairs. Levinson built, reshaped, refined, and promoted his
idea of Outlawry; a movement that would gamer attention from not only governments, but also
the public. He had faith in the people of the world being so against war, that it would be the
population of citizens that pushed for and supported outlawry. Levinson was able to celebrate the
success of the signing of the Kellogg -Briand Pact that outlawed war, but his happiness would not
last long. He would then witness the world tum towards war again, and he must have felt deep
disappointment at the prospect of a second devastating war. However, Levinson never lost hope
in the people, as he always felt that outlawry had to come from those who actually fought in wars
and felt the repercussions of such a horrific institution. He would not live to see the end of
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WWII, so one cannot say how Levinson would have felt about the leaders and peace proceedings
following the war, in comparison to his own idea. Levinson's Outlawry may have been idealistic,
but he never stopped believing that the people and the use of law could bring the world to a state
of peace.
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